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Abstract 
Amidst the global financial uncertainties since 2007, the East and Southeast Asian 
economies continued to attract a significant bulk of the global banks’ loans to emerging 
markets, albeit at a decelerating rate. The alleged advantages of these lending are well-
known.  Yet the recent interruption to this spectacular rise in international bank lending 
during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis serves as a stark reminder that international 
bank lending can rapidly transmit adverse shocks from developed markets to emerging 
markets. The objective of this study is to identify key features and characteristics of foreign 
banks’ activities in East and Southeast Asian economies, particularly during the post 2007 
global financial crisis period, and to weigh their implications on the local economies, 
including policy challenges for the central banks and banking supervisors in the region. 
 
 
JEL Classification: C23, F34, F36, G15 and N25 
 
Key Words: Foreign Banks, Interconnectedness, Financial Stability, Branch, Subsidiary, 
Financial Crisis 
 
*/The early draft of this paper was presented at the  “SEACEN-CeMCoA/BOJ High-Level 
Seminar on Finding Asia's New Sustainable Growth Model Post GFC: The Role of the 
Central Banks”, November 2012 in Kuala Lumpur. Comments and suggestions from the 
participants are greatly acknowledged and appreciated. Views expressed in this study, 
however, are of the author’s own alone and do not necessarily represent those of the 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) and its management. 
 1. Intro
remarka
From th
markets
Amidst 
continu
albeit a
times in
America
respect
Source
 
Source
               
1 The ASE
1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
6,
Dev
duction 
One notab
ble rise in
e first half 
 increased
the global f
ed to attra
t a deceler
ternationa
 and Carib
ively (Figur
: Cetorelli a
: BIS datab
                      
AN+3 include
0
000,000
000,000
000,000
000,000
000,000
000,000
20
05
‐Q1
20
05
Q
2
eloping Europe
le tradema
 cross-bor
of 2006 to t
 from abo
inancial un
ct a signific
ating rate1. 
l bank lend
bean, and 
e 2). 
Figur
nd Goldber
ase 
                      
s the ASEAN‐
20
05
‐Q2
20
05
‐Q3
20
05
‐Q4
20
06
‐Q1
20
06
‐Q2
Developing
Figure 2: Tot
rk of fina
der bankin
he first half
ut USD200
certainties 
ant portion
These eco
ing reporte
Africa and t
e 1: Capita
g (2009) 
 
10 economie
20
06
‐Q3
20
06
‐Q4
20
07
‐Q1
20
07
‐Q2
 Latin America &
al Foreign C
ncial globa
g linkages,
 of 2007, to
 billion to
since 2007
 of the glo
nomies in 
d by the 
he Middle 
l Flows to
s, China (inclu
20
07
‐Q3
20
07
‐Q4
20
08
‐Q1
20
08
‐Q2
 Caribbean
laims from 
lisation in 
 especially
tal loans of
 more tha
, the ASEA
bal banks
average att
emerging m
East during
 the Emerg
ding Hong Ko
20
08
‐Q3
20
08
‐Q4
20
09
‐Q1
20
09
‐Q2
20
09
Q
3
Developing Afric
BIS Reportin
recent ye
 between e
 the global 
n USD500 
N+3 (excl. 
’ loans to 
racted abo
arkets of 
 each quar
ing marke
ng), Japan, K
20
09
‐Q3
20
09
‐Q4
20
10
‐Q1
20
10
‐Q2
20
10
‐Q3
a & Middle East
g Institution
ars has be
merging m
banks to e
billion (Fig
Japan) eco
emerging m
ut 1.4, 1.6 
the Europ
ter of 2010 
ts 
orea and Sing
20
10
Q
3
20
10
‐Q4
20
11
‐Q1
20
11
‐Q2
20
11
‐Q3
ASEAN+3 e
s (USD mn)
1 
en the 
arkets. 
merging 
ure 1). 
nomies 
arkets, 
and 3.2 
e, Latin 
– 2011, 
 
 
apore. 
20
11
‐Q4
20
12
‐Q1
xcl. Japan
2 
 
The alleged advantages of opening the local financial markets to the foreign banks 
are well-known. Under the presence of foreign banks, emerging markets have benefitted 
from efficiency gains manifested in the form of greater variety in financial services and lower 
prices; transfer and spill-over of knowledge and technical know-how as well as greater 
availability of funding most especially to credit-constrained firms and households. Foreign 
bank lending has also been found to be more stable during the past economic and financial 
crises originated from the emerging markets. 
Yet the sudden interruption to this spectacular rise in international bank lending 
during the recent 2007/2008 global financial crisis serves as a stark reminder that 
international bank lending can rapidly transmit adverse shocks from developed markets to 
emerging markets. Compared to long-term equity flows such as foreign direct investment 
(FDI), cross-border bank-intermediated capital flows, being a form of short-term debt capital 
flow, may potentially pose more risk to the recipient economy if not properly managed.  The 
risk exposure may be magnified if the bank loan is in foreign currency and hence subject to 
currency mismatch in the borrowing economies, as was reported during the Asian financial 
crisis in the late 1990s. 
The objective of this study is to identify a number of specific features and 
characteristics of foreign banks’ activities in East and Southeast Asian economies, and to 
weigh their implications on the local economies, including policy challenges to the central 
banks and banking supervisors of the region. While many studies have been carried out on 
these topics, a few have so far focused on these economies.2 The road map of the paper is 
as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents a brief overview of the banking sector landscape 
in the ASEAN+3 economies. Next, Section 3 of the study reviews the literature to take stock 
of factors driving the international bank lending into various Asian economies. Section 4 
dwells into core financial stability implications of the foreign bank activities on the domestic 
economies. Lastly, Section 5 reviews a number of topical debated policy issues, especially in 
the area of central banking. A brief concluding remark section (Section 6) ends the study.  
2. A Brief Overview of Banking Sector Landscape in ASEAN+3 Economies  
Despite their various stages of financial development, banks still, in general, play a 
dominant role in the financial intermediation in most of the ASEAN+3 economies. Advanced 
economies in the region, namely Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore exhibit the highest level 
of banking sector asset in terms of GDP at more than 200 percent (Figure 3). For 
                                                            
2 Among the recent works on the global banking and implications on the East and Southeast Asian 
economies are Siregar and Choy (2010) and Pontines and Siregar (2012).   
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competitors. Foreign banks represent an important share in a few other economies, such as 
Malaysia and Korea, where they account for around 20 percent of the market. For the rest of 
the non-financial centre economies, the overall foreign banks’ presence is relatively modest, 
with usually less than 15 percent of the total assets, and their share in deposit and loans 
could be even lower. For the largest economies in the region (China and Japan), foreign 
banks remain small compared to their domestic counterparts at lower than 4 percent of the 
total banking sector. Foreign banks are usually competing in the same business areas as the 
domestic banks, although depending on the country they are subject to different levels of 
restrictions regarding ownership structure and range of business.  
Major foreign banks in the region have diversified origins and lend to all segments of 
the markets. Some large global banks, such as Citi Group, Bank of America, JP Morgan, 
Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of 
Scotland, BNP Paribas, ANZ, etc., all have representations in the region. Regional banks 
have also become major players in the region, such as CIMB, DBS, OCBC, UOB, Bank of 
China, Bangkok Bank, Maybank, etc. As in other emerging markets of the world, the foreign 
bank’s presence in the region is either in the form of subsidiary or branch (Table 1). With the 
exception of Malaysia, most of the ASEAN+3 economies authorize the establishment of both 
subsidiary and branch in their territories. Between 2010 and 2011, the non-bank private 
sector has been the largest recipient of the global bank lending to the region, absorbing in 
average around 46.5 percent of total lending, followed by public (27.6 percent) and banking 
sectors (25.7 percent) (Figure 4).   
 
Table 1: Status of Selected Foreign Banks in ASEAN+3 Economies 
Malaysia 
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad Subsidiary 
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad Subsidiary 
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. Subsidiary 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad Subsidiary 
Citibank Malaysia (L) Ltd Subsidiary 
Indonesia 
PT Bank ANZ Indonesia Subsidiary 
PT Bank Mizuho Indonesia Subsidiary 
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT Subsidiary 
Citibank Branch 
Deutsche Bank Branch 
HSBC Branch 
Standard Chartered Branch 
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Korea 
Standard Chartered Bank Korea Limited Subsidiary 
Citibank Korea Inc. Subsidiary 
Philippines 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd Branch 
Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd Branch 
Citibank Savings Inc Subsidiary 
United Overseas Bank Philippines Subsidiary 
Thailand 
United Overseas Bank (Thai) PCL Subsidiary 
Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) Public Company Limited Subsidiary 
CIMB Thai Bank Public Company Limited Subsidiary 
 
Source: Annual reports and Bank-scope database  
 
 
Source: BIS database  
 
3. Determinant Factors of Global Bank Lending: A Brief Overview 
Studies have been carried out to ascertain push and pull factors behind the global 
bank lending outside of their home countries. Only a few have however focused on the Asian 
emerging markets. In their recent study, Pontines and Siregar (2011) highlighted several 
fundamental determinant factors of bank lending from three major advanced economies, 
namely Japan, the UK and the US to a number of Asian economies, such as Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. To start, the real GDP growth rates of the home 
(Japan, UK and US) and host Asian economies have, indeed, been an important factor. In 
particular, the pro-cyclicality of these flows, i.e., better (worse) economic conditions in the 
host (home) economies leads to greater (less)  bank flows into some of these Asian 
economies. This was evident in late 2008 and early 2009, following the collapse of the 
Lehman-Brothers, as demonstrated by the UK banks’ lending to the world (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: 
Pro-cyclicality of International Lending of UK Banks and GDP Growth Rate 
 
 
Source: BIS database and AMRO Staff Calculation 
The short-term uncertainties and volatilities of the global economies, captured by the 
widely used S&P 100 Volatility Index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange for instance, 
are found to have adverse impacts on the flows of international bank lending into the East 
Asian region. This finding strongly suggests that global/external factors have a role to play in 
determining bank flows from developed to emerging economies. The balance of the 
evidence also appears to suggest that greater exposure on the part of major foreign banks in 
these Asian economies fulfil a stabilizing or crisis-mitigating role of international bank lending 
during periods of financial distress such as that of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. 
However, the opposite case is found during the recent subprime crisis. In short, the impacts 
and roles of international bank lending in the local economy can be a double-edged sword. 
In good times, the flows contribute positively to the financing of economic activities. 
However, during times of uncertainties in the local and external markets, international bank 
lending can amplify the severity of volatilities and hence the vulnerability risks of the local 
economy. 
Another determinant of the lending of the international banks is bilateral trade 
activities between home and host economies. This is particularly evident for instance in the 
case of early expansion of the Japanese banks to the East Asian markets, as found in 
Siregar and Choy (2010). The same study also found political stability, legal and 
bureaucratic quality have become increasingly important considerations for the expansion of 
global bank lending to East Asia following the 1997 East Asian crisis. Distance plays a role 
as well in various regions of the world. In particular, multinational banks place priority in 
expanding their activities into their close neighbours in the early stage cross-border 
endeavours. Lastly, the strength and soundness of these international banks’ balance 
sheets have also been found to influence their capacities and willingness to loan. This 
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aspect of balance sheet particularly focuses on asset/capital size, solvency, liquidity and 
profitability.     
4. Financial Stability Implications 
Financial stability is receiving increased attention in both policy making and academic 
settings, as concerted efforts are made to draw lessons from the recent global financial 
crisis. The challenge of incorporating the lessons of the crisis is however increasingly more 
difficult, in part, because there is no one clear definition of financial stability (and instability). 
From a more focused point of view shared by many central banks, including those in 
ASEAN+3 economies, financial stability describes the condition where the financial 
intermediation process functions smoothly and there is confidence in the operation of key 
financial institutions and markets within the economy. Others take a slightly broader 
perspective of financial stability that encompasses monetary stability, asset price stability 
and growth stability (Foot (2003)). Financial stability should reflect the ability of the financial 
system to consistently supply the credit intermediation and payment services that are 
needed in the real economy if it is to continue on its growth (Rosengren (2011)). The next 
sub-sections examine a number of frequently debated financial stability consequences of 
foreign bank’s activities on the host economies, particularly the ASEAN+3 economies.  
4.1 Lending Activities 
4.1.1 Global Banks 
The recent global financial crisis provides a rather unique opportunity to assess the 
lending performance of the global banks during the period in which financial turbulence 
originated from the developed economies, home of the major banks of the world. In the past, 
global bank lending had been demonstrably more resilient and better prepared to handle 
shocks originating from emerging markets. The emerging trends from the 2007/2008 global 
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis painted a contrasting picture. 
Claessens and van Horen (2012) study over 3615 banks in 118 countries (of which 1198 
foreign banks) covering the period of 2005-2009. They find conclusive evidence that foreign 
banks reduced lending more compared to their domestic counterparts in 2009. A quick 
glimpse of a number of ASEAN+3 economies supports the findings of Claessens and van 
Horen (2012). The foreign banks’ gross lending in the Philippines for instance grew by 1.1 
percent in 2009 and -10 percent in 2011, significantly lower than 4.6 percent in 2009 and 
18.8 percent in 2011 for the whole banking system. Major European branches and 
subsidiaries in selected ASEAN economies saw their lending to contract and to become 
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more volatile during the period of 2008-2011 (Table 2). Nonetheless, the major local banks 
continued to support their lending growths during those turbulent years.4  
Table 2: 
The Loan Growth of Selected Foreign and Local Banks in ASEAN+3 Economies 
 
(in %) 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Indonesia 
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 25.96 13.78 24 27.69 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk 41.36 29.18 21.62 16.35 
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT 58.17 -91.55 226.37 n.a. 
Malaysia 
Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank 16.04 12.97 10.29 22.47 
CIMB Bank Berhad 17.8 17.18 9.15 11.87 
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 14.39 -3.3 18.74 14.68 
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd 35.52 -18.84 -4.31 8.83 
Citibank (Malaysia) Bhd -2.95 -6.44 4.51 4.29 
Thailand 
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited 13.34 -3.31 9.89 17.14 
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited 18.56 4.3 14.19 12.48 
Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) PCL 13.42 -7.29 18.51 2.74 
 
Source: Bankscope database and AMRO Staff Calculation 
 
Due to the need to shore-up capital and mitigate funding strains, European banks 
have been under heavy pressure to promptly trim down their balance-sheets. In its report, 
the IMF projected banks in the European Union would undergo a USD2.6 trillion 
deleveraging in 2013 and 2014 (WEO (2012)). Moreover, massive bank bailouts using tax 
payer funds during the 2008 global financial crisis have pressured banks to focus more on 
domestic lending activities and prune back on activities abroad. Consequently, economies 
that were highly exposed to the cross-border lending activities of these Eurozone banks 
have had to bear the consequences of recent deleveraging efforts. While the ASEAN+3 
economies (excluding Japan) attracted only around 15 percent of the total foreign claims of 
the Eurozone banks to the emerging markets of the Europe, Latin American and ASEAN+3 
(Figure 6), these economies endured the steepest rates of drops of the Eurozone loans 
during the final two quarters of last year. The total foreign claims of the Eurozone banks to 
the ASEAN+3 economies contracted quarter on quarter by an average of 10.5 percent 
during the second half of 2011, compared to about 4.5 percent for Latin American and 
Caribbean (LATAM) economies and 6.8 percent for the developing European economies. 
                                                            
4 Given the limited publically available balance sheet data on individual major bank, this assessment 
should only be an indicative and may not be conclusive. 
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However in the nominal terms, the developing European economies suffered the sharpest 
pull-outs, a total deleveraging of over USD150 billion during the last 6 months of last year 
compared to about USD59.4 billion for the LATAM and USD 65.6 billion for the ASEAN+3 
economies. The total loan to ASEAN+3 (excl. Japan) for the first quarter 2012 reported a 
positive rebound of around 7 percent from the last quarter of 2011, but still 11 percent less 
than the inflow recorded a year earlier.  
Figure 6: Total Foreign Claims of the Eurozone Banks (in million USD) 
 
Note: LATAM = Latin American and Caribbean economies. The Eurozone banks include banks from 
major creditor economies (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Source: BIS database 
 
The slowdowns in the inflows of claims to ASEAN+3 were evident across 
international banks across the globe but at significantly diverse rates, with non-Eurozone 
banks performing better (Figures 7 and 8). Total foreign claims of the Eurozone, US, UK and 
Japan contracted on a quarterly basis during the second half of last 2011, particularly in the 
last quarter of 20115. As expected, deleveraging by Eurozone banks has been most 
substantial, at an average quarter-on-quarter rate of -7.3 percent since the second quarter of 
2011. This contractionary trend has continued to gain momentum from -1 percent in the 
second quarter 2011, to -7 percent in the third quarter 2011 and -14 percent in the fourth 
quarter 2011. In comparison, total foreign claims on ASEAN+3 of all BIS reporting banks 
only began to contract since the third quarter of 2011 at an average quarter-on-quarter rate 
of 1.38 percent. During the same period, the US and the Japanese bank lending remained 
relatively robust. Japanese banks in particular continued to lend strongly to ASEAN+3 
economies, with the quarter-on-quarter lending growth averaging at 5.44 percent in 2011 
with some moderation observed in the fourth quarter of 2011.  
                                                            
5 As of June 2012, the latest available BIS data on consolidated bank lending is for the fourth quarter 
of 2011.  
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Source: BIS database 
 
 
Source: BIS database 
 
Furthermore, the largest recipients of the global bank loans endured the sharpest 
sudden reversals of the flows. The plus-3 economies (China, Korea and Japan) and the 
financial markets of the region (Hong Kong and Singapore) attracted on averages of nearly 
60 percent and 30 percent of total foreign claims to the ASEAN+3 economies in 2011, 
respectively (Table 3). Yet, the same two groups of economies endured the sharpest 
slowdowns of international bank lending, especially from the Eurozone banks (Figure 9). The 
plus-3 economies reported a quarter-on-quarter pull-out of foreign claims of the Eurozone 
banks on the average of 11 percent per quarter within the last two quarters of 2011, 
compared to 9.9 percent for Hong Kong and Singapore, 8.5 percent for ASEAN-5 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and 6 percent for BCLM (Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). The decline in UK bank lending to the region follows a 
similar trend. It is interesting to note however that the lending of the Japanese and the US 
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banks to the plus-3 economies continued to be robust in the second half of 2011. In 
particular the Japanese banks have continued to expand their foreign lending to China and 
Korea at an average quarter-on-quarter rate of 7.1 percent during the final two quarters of 
last year.    
Table 3: Foreign Claims Shares 
 
 
Source: BIS database 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011‐Q1 2011‐Q2 2011‐Q3 2011‐Q4 2012‐Q1
2012‐Q1 
(% share)
Total ASEAN+3 2,080.55 1,922.99 2,172.81 2,598.38 2,729.00 2,859.45 2,867.10 2,803.76 2,905.66 100.000
Japan 778.45 714.06 769.48 857.59 793.79 808.94 832.28 815.79 833.27 28.677
Hong Kong SAR 331.70 342.80 397.79 481.79 519.77 539.62 547.60 532.46 541.50 18.636
China 214.07 175.81 236.77 356.37 425.11 478.14 487.93 474.29 497.80 17.132
South Korea 331.21 272.94 303.10 318.43 338.00 348.38 318.48 318.10 330.69 11.381
Singapore 191.46 187.74 212.20 261.58 292.39 310.30 312.25 298.71 318.02 10.945
Malaysia 104.25 98.81 103.55 125.42 139.37 145.48 140.16 144.33 151.91 5.228
Indonesia 46.72 47.86 54.52 74.41 84.06 88.45 87.78 88.29 89.94 3.095
Thailand 44.89 46.52 56.72 73.42 82.69 84.37 83.49 75.69 85.36 2.938
Philippines 23.32 21.37 23.53 30.34 32.44 32.67 34.04 32.04 31.94 1.099
Vietnam 11.49 11.48 12.45 15.81 16.90 18.40 18.42 18.99 20.13 0.693
Brunei 1.71 2.11 2.03 2.40 3.71 3.67 3.89 4.08 4.01 0.138
Myanmar 0.85 1.00 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.43 0.015
Laos 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.012
Cambodia 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.19 0.43 0.21 0.29 0.32 0.011
Foreign claims on ASEAN+3 countries (USD bn, ultimate risk basis)
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Figure 9: Growths of Foreign Claims to ASEAN+3 Economies 
     
  
     
   
 Source: BIS database and AMRO Staff Calculation 
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The high exposure to ASEAN+3 economies through cross-border lending partially 
explains relatively large cutbacks in the international bank lending to the region.6 Further 
investigation into the composition of total foreign claims of global banks into the ASEAN+3 
region shows that a significant share of total claims (around 40 percent) has been in the form 
of cross-border lending (Figure 10). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Latin 
American countries where local lending of international banks proportionally larger than their 
cross-border lending. For Indonesia, China, Philippines and the CLMV economies 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam), the share of cross-border lending out of overall 
foreign claims are well above 50 percent. This is considerably higher than the 17 to 27 
percent share of cross-border lending activities for Eurozone claims in major Latin American 
economies, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. As demonstrated in selected ASEAN+3 
economies’ experiences (Figure 11), the growths of cross-border lending have largely been 
more volatile and often experienced sudden and sharper withdrawals than the local lending. 
At the height of the Lehman Brothers crisis, the total cross-border lending to ASEAN+3 
region plummeted by more than -15 percent in the second quarter of 2009 from the same 
quarter a year earlier, while the local claims of these banks in the region continued to 
expand robustly at above 33 percent for the same period.   
Figure 10: Shares of Cross Border Claims and Local Claims at the End 2011 
 
Source: BIS database and AMRO Staff Calculation 
  
                                                            
6 Total foreign claims of global banks can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is the local 
lending component which is lending carried out by local subsidiaries or branches of a particular global 
bank, using funding generated from the local economy. The second component is the cross-border 
lending which are sourced from the external network or head-quarters of the bank.  
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Figure 11: Quarterly Growths of Different Forms of Claims 
 
Note:  Source: BIS database and Staff Calculation 
Lending of the international banks targets three domestic sectors: public, non-bank 
private and banking sector. Among the various domestic sectors, the banking sector of the 
ASEAN+3 economies suffered the worst cuts in the lending of the foreign banks in 2011 and 
early 2012. From third quarter of 2011 to first quarter of 2012, foreign claims to the banking 
sector grew in average of 6.5 percent, the slowest compare to 8.9 percent of the public 
sector and 10.3 percent of the non-bank private sector (Figure 12). In particular, the financial 
centres of the ASEAN+3 economies, Hong Kong and Singapore, experienced the most 
noticeable contractions in the claims to the banking sector. During the first quarter of 2012, 
foreign claims to the banking sector of Hong Kong and Singapore declined by 17.9 percent 
from a year earlier, in contrast to a positive growth of 12.1 percent for the public sector and 
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9.6 percent for the non-bank private sector. It is also noteworthy that among the three 
sectors, the banking sector of the ASEAN+3 had also suffered the worst sudden reversal of 
capital flows during the height of the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse. The strength of the 
lending to the public sector, on the other hand, reflected the attractiveness of the sovereign 
debts of the emerging markets in the region. 
Figure 12: Allocations of International Bank Lending 
 
Source: BIS database and AMRO Staff Calculation 
 
4.1.2 Regional Banks 
While the focus of this study is on the implication of the global major banks’ activities 
in the ASEAN+3 economies, it is however important to recognize the increasing role of the 
ASEAN+3 banks regionally and globally. The ASEAN+3 economies had turned into a net 
lender to the world since 2010, with an average net lending of around USD 465 billion per 
quarter as reported in the first quarter of 2012 (Table 4). With the exception of BCLM 
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database, the international claims of banks from five ASEAN+3 economies (Japan, 
Singapore, Hongkong, Korea and Malaysia) reached around USD4.05 trillion in the second 
quarter of 2011 or around 66 percent increase from the number reported in the first quarter 
of 2006 (Figure 13). The Japanese banks’ loans continued to play a big role, making up 
slightly over 50 percent of the total international claims of this group of banks. From the 
second half of 2010 to first half 2011, the quarterly average of the year-on-year growths of 
the international claims from these countries’ banks is reported to be above 17 percent.7 
Given their increasingly important presence, regionally and globally, understanding of the 
networks and interconnectedness of these ASEAN+3 banks should be greatly enhanced to 
assess potential challenges or concerns of their operations, particularly on the local and 
regional economies. With the exception of the Japanese banks, data on the cross-border 
lending activities of the regional banks are however publically inaccessible.      
 
Table 4: Net Lending to the World 
USD billion 2011:q1 2011:q2 2011:q3 2011:q4 2012:q1
ASEAN+3 411 493 561 396 466 
ASEAN-5 75 82 82 70 72 
Plus-3 321 352 388 298 376 
BCLM -4 -5 -4 -5 -5 
Hong Kong and Singapore 19 64 95 33 22 
 
Note: ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Plus-3 
includes China, Korea and Japan. BCLM includes Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 
Source: BIS database 
 
  
                                                            
7 The banks from Malaysia have been the most aggressive one with quarterly average of year on year 
growth over 30 percent. 
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Figure 13: Outstanding Claims of Banks from Selected ASEAN+3 Economies 
  
 
Source: BIS database 
 
 
4.2 Strength of Bank Balance Sheet  
4.2.1 Capital Adequacy Level 
Banks in the region have generally held adequate capital. Even during the peak of 
the crisis, banks are able to maintain a sound level of capital, usually above 12 percent. 
Most banks, however, did experience a slight drop in capital adequacy level in 2010 or 2011, 
except for a few, such as those in Japan and Philippines, who have in general been able to 
slightly increase their capital adequacy recently (Figure 14). In addition, foreign banks in 
most parts of the region have maintained a higher capital adequacy level than their local 
counterparts (Table 5). For example in Philippines, the capital adequacy level of foreign 
bank branches and subsidiaries has been at least 5 percent higher than the national 
average. The situation is a little different in regional financial centres, where foreign banks 
did not always hold a capital adequacy ratio above the local banks’. Furthermore, foreign 
banks’ capital positions are affected differently by the current round of crisis. Banks with 
parents in Europe or US, such as HSBC and Citibank, have in general seen a larger 
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magnitude of drop of capital in some economies (Indonesia, Hong Kong for example) during 
the crisis than other foreign banks in the ASEAN+3 region. This is partly explained by the 
deleveraging process unfolding in the advanced economies. 
  
Figure 14: Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
 
 
Source: IMF-Financial Stability Indicator Database 
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Table 5: 
Capital Adequacy Ratio of Selected Banks in Selected ASEAN+3 Economies 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank-scope database and Annual Reports 
 
4.2.2 Liquidity Position 
Both foreign and local banks in general remain liquid. With few exceptions, the 
standard liquidity ratio (net loan to deposit ratio) of selected major local and foreign banks 
have in general been stable between 2006 and 2011 (Table 6). Nonetheless, a number of 
noticeable increases in the ratio suggest some deterioration of the liquidity position in recent 
years. More importantly, the marginal decline in the liquidity position has been widely 
reported by local, regional and global foreign banks. As in the case of the CAR earlier, we do 
also find evidences that liquidity position of the European and the US banks in particular has 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Malaysia
Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank 17.5 13.4 14.3 11.5 9.8 9.7 13.4 12.5 14.3 12.7 14.1 12.6
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 9.9 10.2 11.1 9.2 10.0 n.a. 13.6 14.4 15.8 13.4 15.1 n.a.
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 11.3 9.2 9.6 8.6 8.0 9.6 13.5 13.4 15.0 13.8 13.7 13.2
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 14.4 16.9 15.0 14.5 n.a. 14.6 14.5 17.2 15.3 14.9 n.a. 15.0
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 22.2 22.1 26.5 23.8 25.8 31.6 23.2 23.1 27.8 25.0 27.1 33.2
Citibank Malaysia (L) Ltd n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Indonesia
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 12.4 10.1 12.4 12.8 17.0 19.1 15.0 13.4 15.4 15.7 20.8 24.6
PT Bank ANZ Indonesia 12.0 11.2 13.0 15.0 16.8 16.9 13.0 12.3 14.1 16.3 18.1 17.6
PT Bank Mizuho Indonesia 16.1 18.8 24.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.3 20.0 25.1 19.7 26.6 25.3
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 56.9 76.9 70.9
Citibank (Capital Adequacy Ratio ‐ with credit and market risk) 25.3 26.8 30.5 24.1 20.8
Deutsche Bank (Capital Adequacy Ratio) 29.8 33.3 47.0 46.9 n.a.
HSBC (Capital Adequacy Ratio) 17.6 13.2 19.1 12.0 14.6
Standard Chartered (Capital Adequacy Ratio) 14.1 14.4 14.6 13.3 13.3
Korea
Kookmin Bank 10.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Standard Chartered Bank Korea Limited 11.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Citibank Korea Inc. 13.4 14.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.4 17.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Philippines
Philippines banking system: Capital Adequacy Ratio 16.3 16.0 14.9 14.7 14.7
Foreign bank branches and subsidiaries: Capital Adequacy Ratio 21.6 21.9 19.4 22.5 21.3
Existing foreign bank branches: Capital Adequacy Ratio 18.5 18.8 12.8 18.4 17.1
New foreign bank branches: Capital Adequacy Ratio 28.9 29.5 35.2 34.9 32.1
Foreign bank susidiaries: Capital Adequacy Ratio 19.6 18.0 19.1 17.0 23.3
Thailand
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited 12.2 12.5 12.6 11.2 12.0 11.7 15.4 16.1 15.5 13.8 14.5 14.5
Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited 11.1 11.6 12.3 11.0 10.6 11.4 14.5 15.5 16.5 15.2 13.1 14.4
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited 9.6 9.4 10.3 9.8 10.7 10.5 13.8 14.0 15.2 15.1 14.6 14.7
United Overseas Bank (Thai) PCL 15.5 17.8 19.5 17.0 16.5 16.4 16.7 19.0 21.2 18.5 17.7 17.4
Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) Public Company Limited 17.1 15.1 18.3 12.1 13.9 n.a. 17.1 15.1 18.7 12.5 14.2 n.a.
CIMB Thai Bank Public Company Limited 7.7 9.0 6.0 3.6 0.8 4.1 13.0 14.7 12.0 5.8 1.5 6.0
Capital Adequacy Ratio (in %) Tier 1 Ratio Total Capital Adequacy Ratio
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Singapore
DBS Bank Ltd n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.1 8.9 10.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.0 13.4 14.4
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCB 14.5 16.3 16.0 14.9 11.5 13.1 15.7 17.6 16.5 15.2 12.5 15.8
United Overseas Bank Limited UOB 13.5 15.3 14.0 10.9 10.0 11.0 16.7 19.8 19.0 15.3 14.5 16.3
Citibank Singapore Limited n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.1 11.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.2 11.9 n.a.
Hong Kong
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limite n.a. 11.7 12.2 10.3 8.8 12.3 n.a. 14.7 16.1 13.4 11.6 13.5
BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd 12.5 11.3 11.6 10.9 12.2 13.4 16.9 16.1 16.9 16.2 13.1 14.0
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 12.5 11.3 11.6 10.9 12.2 13.4 16.9 16.1 16.9 16.2 13.1 14.0
Hang Seng Bank Ltd. 11.6 10.8 12.8 9.5 8.4 10.7 14.3 13.6 15.8 12.5 11.2 13.6
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited n.a. 10.9 14.4 11.7 10.5 n.a. n.a. 12.8 14.4 13.1 13.2 14.9
DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 12.2 12.7 12.6 9.8 11.4 11.6 14.5 15.2 15.6 13.1 15.1 15.9
Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited 25.9 20.7 28.3 14.4 13.7 14.8 27.2 20.7 29.1 15.2 14.3 15.4
Japan
Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd (The)-Kabushiki 11.4 10.8 7.6 7.4 7.7 7.1 15.8 15.5 12.0 11.2 12.8 12.5
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 14.3 12.3 9.2 7.6 7.2 5.6 19.2 16.7 13.5 12.2 13.0 10.8
Mizuho Bank 10.4 7.7 6.7 7.3 7.5 5.8 14.9 12.9 11.8 12.0 12.3 10.3
Citibank Japan Ltd 25.1 24.5 22.9 14.6 n.a. n.a. 25.2 25.1 23.1 14.6 n.a. n.a.
CAR (in %) Tier 1 Ratio Total Capital Adequacy Ratio
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fallen more substantially than that of the local or regional banks. Moreover, the liquidity 
position of the foreign banks relative to local banks varies across banks and host economies. 
In the case of the Philippines, the local banks are in average more liquid than the foreign 
banks. This is not necessarily the case however when we observe closely the cases of 
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. The HSBC in Malaysia, Hong 
Kong and the Citibank in Singapore and Hong Kong for instance continued to maintain a 
relatively strong loan to deposit level, although noticeably higher than during the pre-2008 
period. It should be noted however that these analyses are based on a rather limited 
available sample set of observations. 
 
Table 6: Liquidity Position 
 
 
Source: Bank-scope database and Annual Bank Reports 
 
 
  
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Singapore
DBS Bank Ltd 74.5 73.5 69.3 73.0 66.4
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCBC 72.4 74.9 71.8 76.0 68.5
United Overseas Bank Limited UOB 72.4 64.1 65.8 67.4 66.6
Citibank Singapore Limited n.a. 40.8 38.2 22.7 21.8
Nomura Singapore Limited n.a. 44.7 43.4 57.9 56.3
Hong Kong
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited n.a. 53.0 43.3 45.1 43.9
BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd 54.5 47.9 55.4 52.3 48.2
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 54.3 47.8 55.2 51.6 48.3
Hang Seng Bank Ltd. 63.5 65.3 51.7 53.5 52.8
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 56.6 56.5 42.1 44.1 47.9
DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 86.5 74.8 69.8 71.8 64.6
Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited 47.2 38.8 30.1 33.3 28.1
Japan
Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd 51.7 56.4 63.7 63.1 60.6
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 56.9 65.0 68.2 71.1 74.1
Mizuho Bank 50.5 50.2 59.7 56.0 58.6
Citibank Japan Ltd 9.3 7.7 6.0 6.6 n.a.
Liquidity Ratio (in %) Net Loans / Dep & ST Funding
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Malaysia
Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank 77.8 76.4 74.6 76.8 67.5
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 57.2 61.7 60.3 66.8 63.8
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 73.9 74.1 62.9 56.7 55.1
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 10.5 8.8 9.6 14.0 10.0
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 71.1 62.8 57.7 60.8 52.5
Citibank Malaysia (L) Ltd n.a. 61.7 61.9 82.3 75.9
Indonesia
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 69.2 63.3 56.0 54.4 48.3
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (The) - Indones n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 54.2
PT Bank ANZ Indonesia 76.8 78.7 72.7 83.2 59.6
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT n.a. 18.6 34.2 88.8 136.1
Citibank (Loan to Deposit Ratio) 66.7 69.2 73.6 79.5 70.8
Deutsche Bank (Loan to Deposit Ratio) 50.8 52.4 60.2 68.0
HSBC (Loan to Deposit Ratio) 77.9 72.6 72.3 67.3 65.9
Standard Chartered (Loan to Deposit Ratio) 88.6 101.8 81.3 84.7 61.0
Philippines
Philippines banking system: Gross loans to deposits 70 64.4 68.1 69.7 70.9
Foreign bank branches and subsidiaries: Gross loans to deposits 86.7 101.2 96.4 102.5 83.5
Existing foreign bank branches: Gross loans to deposits 81.9 99.9 95.2 97.5 80.7
New foreign bank branches: Gross loans to deposits 102.9 112 111 119 91.5
Foreign bank susidiaries: Gross loans to deposits 77 85.7 76.4 94.9 83.1
Thailand
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited 79.4 73.5 71.4 78.6 71.4
Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited 85.8 86.7 86.7 88.6 85.5
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited 88.1 87.9 86.1 81.0 88.4
United Overseas Bank (Thai) PCL 72.6 77.6 74.0 88.1 80.9
Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) Public Company Limited 52.4 55.6 47.8 47.9 45.2
CIMB Thai Bank Public Company Limited 83.5 79.5 72.6 48.1 49.6
Liquidity Ratio (in %) Net Loans / Dep & ST Funding
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4.2.3 Profitability 
Banks have been able to remain profitable throughout the crisis. In some economies 
the return to equity level is relatively high at above 15 percent, such as Indonesia, China, 
and Hong Kong, while in others the levels can be more modest at 5-10 percent, such as 
Japan, Korea and Thailand (Figure 15). While profitability levels vary across the region, 
banks have been able to maintain decent returns throughout the crisis, even rising 
profitability in some economies such as Korea and Philippines. The net interest margin (NIM) 
as an important contributor to profitability has dropped in most of the countries since the start 
of the crisis, with some countries faring better than the others (Table 7). 
 
Figure 15: Return to Equity 
 
 
Source: IMF-Financial Stability Indicator Database 
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Table 7: Profit Indicators 
 
 
 
Source: Bankscope database and Annual Reports 
 
Most foreign banks exhibit a lower profitability than their local counterparts in recent 
years. This is perhaps not surprising in most economies in this region, particularly wherein 
foreign banks only control a modest market share and usually maintain a higher capital 
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Malaysia
Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank 2.5 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 2.8 12.6 14.9 -1.7 13.7 17.5 16.3
HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 2.2 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.3 3.3 22.6 18.8 17.9 28.6 27.1 28.5
Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.6 3.3 2.9 21.0 17.8 13.4 37.4 29.9 26.6
Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 3.4 4.0 11.1 9.7 15.2 16.5 16.4
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Malaysia) Berhad 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5 3.2 9.3 10.1 10.2 13.3 8.6 14.3
Citibank Malaysia (L) Ltd n.a. 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 n.a. n.a. 19.8 13.1 16.5 28.6 n.a.
Indonesia
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk 5.1 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.1 4.5 24.2 24.2 20.8 17.8 15.6 9.8
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limite n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.8 8.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 216.2 87.9
PT Bank ANZ Indonesia 7.6 8.6 6.3 7.8 9.5 9.7 12.4 9.4 1.2 20.9 16.9 16.4
PT Bank Mizuho Indonesia 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.5 4.3 8.8 12.8 11.1 11.5 11.3 14.8
Bank BNP Paribas Indonesia PT n.a. 2.4 4.1 4.3 5.1 4.6 n.a. 6.7 16.8 17.0 10.1 12.5
Citibank* 4.1 4.8 6.7 7.7 8.4 19.1 23.5 25.3 28.1 33.2
Deutsche Bank* 8.1 1.0 3.1 3.4 27.8 14.1 18.8 22.8
HSBC* 5.3 5.4 7.9 8.7 9.5 16.3 18.3 11.0 14.4 13.9
Standard Chartered* 4.6 3.7 4.1 5.2 3.7 18.9 10.5 16.9 19.6 23.1
Korea
Kookmin Bank 2.6 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.2 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Standard Chartered Bank Korea Limited 2.6 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.2 6.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Citibank Korea Inc. 3.1 2.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.5 9.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Philippines
Philippines banking system** 12.5 12.2 10.8 6.9 10.7
Foreign bank branches and subsidiaries** 10.6 9 8.3 6.4 11.9
Existing foreign bank branches** 9.8 13.5 12.3 8.9 19.4
New foreign bank branches** 11 5.5 6.2 7.5 7.8
Foreign bank susidiaries** 12.3 4.1 1.5 -5.4 -6.1
Thailand
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.4 11.6 11.7 11.2 11.9 12.3 12.5
Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited 3.4 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 21.2 16.4 15.5 17.8 16.5 13.6
Kasikornbank Public Company Limited 3.9 3.6 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.3 16.8 15.6 12.2 14.4 15.9 16.4
United Overseas Bank (Thai) PCL 3.0 3.2 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.8 0.4 3.6 2.8 5.6 -0.4 2.5
Standard Chartered Bank (Thai) Public Company Li 3.1 2.7 2.7 3.0 4.2 n.a. 10.5 5.7 6.3 9.2 8.3 n.a.
CIMB Thai Bank Public Company Limited 3.4 4.0 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.0 10.5 8.5 0.1 -67.9 -277.4 -69.2
* For Citi, Deutsch, HSBC and Standard Chartered in Indonesia, Return on Assets and Return on Equity from Annual Reports
** Return on Assets and Return on Equity from A Status Report on the Philippine Financial System.
Profitability (in %) Net Interest Margin Return on Avg Equity
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Singapore
DBS Bank Ltd 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 10.6 6.5 8.8 9.1 11.1 12.1
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCB 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 10.1 10.8 10.7 10.5 13.9 15.1
United Overseas Bank Limited UOB 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 10.5 13.3 11.0 11.7 12.5 16.2
Citibank Singapore Limited n.a. 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.2 n.a. n.a. 12.9 19.4 24.6 20.5 n.a.
Credit Suisse (Singapore) Limited n.a. n.a. 1.2 2.4 1.1 1.1 n.a. n.a. 10.3 -3.7 17.1 18.8
Barclays Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd n.a. n.a. 3.6 2.4 1.7 3.5 n.a. n.a. 18.1 24.4 25.4 85.1
Nomura Singapore Limited n.a. 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.4 n.a. -22.3 -56.7 3.4 5.9 10.7
Hong Kong
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limite n.a. 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.0 2.1 n.a. 20.6 21.0 24.7 27.5 22.6
BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.1 16.6 14.8 14.9 3.3 17.4 17.0
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Limited 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.9 18.2 16.0 15.6 8.1 19.0 18.1
Hang Seng Bank Ltd. 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.0 23.6 24.7 26.3 29.2 38.9 29.0
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.7 21.0 15.8 14.2 18.1 24.6 22.6
DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.7 10.6 11.1 13.2 11.1 17.6 18.1
Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.8 3.4 3.4 11.1 9.5 17.4 36.4 53.7 38.8
Japan
Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd (The)-Kabushiki 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 8.6 5.3 -2.0 7.8 9.4 15.7
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 7.7 7.3 -5.5 8.0 9.2 14.9
Mizuho Bank 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 7.1 3.0 -17.6 10.0 9.7 8.8
Citibank Japan Ltd 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 n.a. n.a. 4.4 4.0 9.2 9.1 n.a. n.a.
Barclays Capital Japan Limited n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.7 -6.3 1.3 n.a. n.a.
Société Générale Private Banking (Japan) Limited n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -18.7 -28.5
Profitability (in %) Net Interest Margin Return on Avg Equity
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adequacy level than the local banks. Moreover, the profitability of the foreign banks largely 
depends on their business locations rather than parent bank origins. Although banks in 
advanced countries such as US or Europe are hit harder than banks in other places, the 
performance of their subsidiaries or branches in the ASEAN+3 region is largely determined 
by the local business conditions, and do not show significant higher volatility of profitability. 
Despite the swings their parent banks are experiencing in terms of capital and profitability, 
the foreign bank branches or subsidiaries in the ASEAN+3 region have seen steady 
profitability during the crisis (although slightly lower in some economies). Some foreign 
banks have achieved higher profitability in the recent years, such as in the Philippines and 
Thailand, which is generally in line with the overall profitability development in the banking 
sectors of the respective countries. This suggests that the profitability of foreign bank 
branches or subsidiaries in this region are perhaps less affected by the performance of their 
parent banks but more by local factors, particularly the growth rate of the host economies. 
 
4.3 Trade Financing 
Two key factors have frequently been underlined by early studies as root causes of 
poor export/trade performance of the East and Southeast Asian economies at the height of 
the 1997 East Asian crisis. The first factor is the exchange rate risk, and the second is the 
scarcity of short-term trade financing facilities.  Accompanying the sharp fall in global trade, 
the joint IMF–Banker’s Association for Trade and Finance (BAFT) survey found the decrease 
in the value of trade finance accelerated between October 2008 and January 2009 in almost 
every region of the world (BAFT, 2009).  Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that 85–90 
percent of the fall in world trade since the second half of 2008 is due to falling international 
demand, and 10–15 percent is attributable to a fall in the supply of trade finance (Auboin, 
2009). Claudio (2008) further claimed that the role of trade financing has been strengthened 
by the structure of production lines through regional supply chains and the move to the 
greater cross-border dispersion of component production and assemblies within vertically 
integrated production processes in Asia. A recent work (Siregar 2009) on the experiences of 
Indonesia, Thailand and Korea from 1993 to 2009 confirmed the importance of trade 
financing on the overall export performance of these three economies.8  
                                                            
8 The study finds that a 1 percent drop in the trade finance could lead to around 0.2-0.4 percent drops 
in the exports. Furthermore, the study also claims that the more developed a country’s financial sector 
the more significant the role of trade financing would likely to be. 
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Wholesale funding activities, especially in the areas of trade and project financing, 
remain a concern in the event of a prolonged deleveraging by the advanced economies’ 
lenders. Banks and non-bank financial institutions from major European economies, in 
particular from the UK, Germany, France and Spain, have long been the major providers and 
underwriters of trade financing to emerging markets in Asia and Pacific (Figure 16). Based 
on the March 2012 BIS report, trade and project financing activities of Eurozone lenders 
have been most affected by the deleveraging process. While total lending globally by the 
weaker European banks were scaled back by about 15 percent in the second half of 2011, 
project and trade financing were reduced by 39 percent and 23.5 percent respectively. The 
larger proportions of cuts in trade and project financing were also reported by many 
Eurozone lenders.  
Figure 16: Export Credit Agency Backed Trade Finance in Asia 
 
Source: Barclays Capital 
 
Assessing the full impact of on-going Eurozone bank deleveraging on trade financing 
and subsequently on trade performance is challenging in the absence of detailed information 
and data on the different types of loans (including trade and project financing) that have 
been extended to ASEAN+3 economies. However, a straightforward mapping of the growth 
rates of the bilateral bank lending from four major Eurozone economies and the ASEAN-5 
economies and Korea, and of the bilateral trades (exports and imports) between the same 
sets of economies visibly signal a high degree co-movements between them, especially 
since 2005 (Figure 17). A similar co-movement between bilateral loans from the UK banks to 
ASEAN-5 and Korea and bilateral trades between UK and the same set of Asian economies 
is well traced during the same period (Figure 18).    
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Figure 17: 
Bilateral Lending and Trade of Four Eurozone Economies and ASEAN-5 and Korea 
 
 
Note: Four Eurozone economies are France, Germany Spain, and Netherlands. ASEAN-5 includes 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. All growth rates are in percentages. 
Source: AMRO Staff calculation, BIS database and CEIC. 
 
Figure 18: Bilateral Lending and Trade of UK and ASEAN-5 and Korea 
 
 
Note: ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Source: AMRO 
Staff calculation, BIS database and CEIC.  
 
The parallel movements of the trade and lending series arguably point to either 
bilateral trade activities lead to higher demand for bilateral bank lending or vice-versa, and 
therefore corroborate the claims that a portion of the lending by the global banks directly 
associated with trade financing. A set of pair-wise granger causality testing confirms the two-
ways relationships between lending and trade (Table 8). As much as bilateral trade activities 
between the ASEAN+3 economies and the major global trading partners (US, UK, Japan 
and Euro) could have induced more demand for trade financing, the availability of trade 
financing facility may have also further fuelled bilateral trade activities between these 
economies. The Granger-causality test, in particular, confirm that the availability of financing 
has boosted bilateral trade activities between selected ASEAN+3 economies with their key 
global trading partners (US and UK) with about 2-4 quarters lag. This set of test results 
supports the early stylized fact that the US and the UK banks are important suppliers of 
trade financing to the ASEAN+3 region. On the other hand, the granger causality test results 
found a less significant role of the Eurozone bank lending in explaining bilateral exports with 
this small subset of the ASEAN+3 economies (Table 8). Unfortunately, long enough 
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individual time-series data on loans for trade and project financing for ASEAN+3 economies 
are not publically available for the testing to be carried out in a more comprehensive manner.      
Table 8: Granger-Causality Testing for Bilateral Export and Lending 
(Period: 2000:q1 – 2011q4) 
a). Bilateral Export Does Granger-Cause Bilateral Lending 
    Eurozone 
 US UK Japan Germany Italy Spain 
Indonesia Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Korea No No Yes Yes No No 
Malaysia No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Philippines No Yes No Yes No No 
Thailand No No Yes No No Yes 
 
b). Bilateral Lending Does Granger-Cause Bilateral Export 
    Eurozone 
 US UK Japan Germany Italy Spain 
Indonesia Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Korea Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Malaysia Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Philippines Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Thailand Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Source: AMRO Staff Calculation 
 
4.4 Asset Markets: Boom and Bust Factors 
The strong relation between asset prices and bank lending has long been spotted, 
particularly during periods of severe economic and financial crisis. Real effects are particular 
grave if a bubble occurs in the real estate market, but stock prices can experience 
substantial declines as well. Two ways of transmission of shocks have been reported. One 
way is for the asset price slump to affect balance sheets of banks and therefore their lending 
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capacities. Reciprocally, a dry-up in liquidity/funding due to a sudden pull-out in the bank 
lending (including those of the foreign banks) could lead to falling asset prices. Seminal 
studies in this topic are on the great depression period (Bernanke 1983 and 1995) and on 
the East Asian crisis (Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003)).  
As in other parts of the globe, foreign bank lending potentially contributed to the 
general rising residential house price level in ASEAN+3 economies. The annualized 
quarterly growths of residential house price in selected ASEAN+3 economies (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Korea and Japan) since 
2005 are found to be positively related to the exposure levels of those economies to the 
foreign bank lending (Figure 19). A closer observation also reveals that during the boom 
period of the foreign bank lending to East Asia from 2005 to the second quarter of 2008, 
foreign bank lending and residential property rose in tandem. On the other hand, a reversal 
or pull-out of these lending immediately after the Lehman collapse seems to be followed 
closely by a period of housing price correction within 1-2 quarters. This was particularly 
apparent in Hong Kong, Singapore and to some extent Malaysia and Thailand, but less in 
Indonesia and the Philippines.9  Unfortunately, the limited observation set does not allow us 
to robustly test the causality between lending and property price, particularly for the crisis 
period. 
  
                                                            
9 A more in-depth research to understand the link between real estate price and foreign bank lending 
is warranted. In particular, one may want to look into the breakdowns of the foreign bank lending to 
understand the share that goes to the property market. 
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Figure 19: Global Bank Lending Exposure and Residential Property Price 
 
 
The interconnectedness between the asset markets and the global banking sector is 
also evident from the recent performance of stock exchange markets within the ASEAN+3 
region. As demonstrated in Figure 20, the performance of the stock markets of selected non-
financial centre ASEAN+3 economies in 2009-2010, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, 
appears to be negatively affected by their exposures to the claims of the global banks 
(Figure 20). In particular, the more exposed the financial sector was to foreign bank cross-
border lending, the more severe the losses in these respective stock markets. A similar trend 
is reported during the recent Eurozone sovereign debt turmoil in 2011. The negative 
relationship seems to be more pronounced when we focus for the case of Eurozone banks’ 
lending in 2011. 
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Figure 20: Global Bank Lending Exposure and Stock Exchange Performance 
 
 
 
Source: CEIC database and BIS. 
 
5. Practical Implication to Banking Regulation and Monetary Policy Management 
5.1 Strengthening Supervisory Capacity: Beyond Local Jurisdiction  
y = ‐0.14x + 47.11
‐40
‐20
0
20
40
60
80
100
25 45 65 85 105 125 145 165 185 205 225
Sto
ck Ind
ex (%
 YoY)
Foreign claims/GDP (%)
From 2nd quarter 2009  to 2nd  quarter 2010
y = ‐0.047x + 17.23
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 50 100 150 200 250
Sto
ck In
de
x (%
 YoY
)
Foreign claims/GDP (%)
2011
y = ‐0.61x + 55.39
‐40
‐20
0
20
40
60
80
100
15 25 35 45 55 65
Sto
ck In
dex
 (% Y
oY)
Cross border claims/GDP (%)
From 2nd quarter 2009  to 2nd  quarter  2010
y = ‐0.09x + 15.89
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Sto
ck
 Ind
ex
 (% 
Yo
Y)
Cross border claims/GDP (%)
2011
30 
 
Following the 1997 East Asian crisis, the collapse of banking sectors in a number of 
East Asian economies underscored the inadequate supervisory capacities in our region. The 
shortcoming was partly due to the failure to keep up with the reform and the development of 
the banking sector. Not only that the sector quickly opened up to the foreign banks, but with 
the accompanied reform of the capital and insurance markets, banks are providing services 
beyond the conventional banking activities, such as offering investment 
instruments/derivatives and insurance policies. The emergence of the “supermarket” banks 
warrants a closer integration among the financial market supervisory agencies in the 
domestic economy.  
Fast forward more than a decade later, the challenges facing financial sector 
supervisors become more complex globally, including those in the emerging markets of East 
and Southeast Asia. The banking sectors are not only deeply interconnected regionally, but 
also globally. As elaborated, the local and regional banks have not only borrowed heavily 
from, but also extended loans to global banking system. The traditional global banks, such 
as the HSBC and the Standard Chartered bank, have increasingly become regional banks10. 
At the same time, many of the ASEAN banks, such as the DBS, OCBC, UOB, MayBank and 
the CIMB, have become regional and global banks. The need to integrate financial market 
supervisory agencies is no longer a domestic issue. Given the cross-border nature of these 
banks’ operations, the regular supervision on domestic activities of these banks will not be 
sufficient to assess the overall risk exposures. There are a number of lessons from the 
recent global financial crisis that underscore the importance of establishing a closer 
coordination among banking supervisors across the borders.  
To start, a much more in-depth research needs to be undertaken to fully grasp the 
interconnectedness of the domestic banking sector, regionally and globally. Mapping the 
networks and degree of integration of the regional banking systems is urgently needed 
before even formulating steps to enhance the supervisory capacities of the networks. This 
study has so far identified potential areas of issues that need to be further examined. The 
lack of timely and publically available data on the detailed breakdowns of foreign bank 
lending directed for trade and project financing inhibits efforts in conducting more in-depth 
analyses on the lending activities of the foreign banks. Furthermore, data on the lending 
activities of the regional banks are not publically available.  While the frequently visited BIS 
database reports bilateral lending from the advanced economies’ banks to most individual 
ASEAN+3 economies, no disaggregated level of lending data to various destinations, 
particularly to the ASEAN+3 economies, is reported for Singaporean, Malaysian, Korean and 
                                                            
10 As discussed and will be elaborated more, these banks’ operations in ASEAN+3 become more 
independent from the Headquarters of these banks. 
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Indonesian banks. In fact, only the bilateral lending of the Japanese banks is regularly 
reported at this time. Without these valuable information and data, potential contagion or 
spill-over within the banking sectors of the region and the world will likely be underestimated. 
The recent global events also demonstrate that the economic cost of gaps in 
regulation across banking supervisors across economies will likely be amplified. A tougher 
set of regulation by the Financial Service Authority in UK introduced in the past two years, 
including on mode of entry (branch or subsidiary) and more rigorous liquidity rules, has 
resulted in international banks pulling out big shares of their activities away from London to 
other European economies with less-regulated financial markets. Expansion of global banks 
has increasingly been influenced by the rules and regulations of domestic supervisors 
relative to their foreign counterparts. 
Another concrete lesson from the recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone area is 
on the design of legal framework to inject emergency funds required to bail-out trouble 
banks. Given the cross-border networks of the banks, any bail-out program must be 
coordinated across the border. An important hurdle of the bail-out program in the European 
economies is with the lack of cross-border integrated supervisory capacity to fully assess the 
extensiveness of the bail-outs needed. The failure to mitigate the impacts of the Lehman-
Brothers’ debacle in 2008 for instance could arguably be attributed to the lack of cooperation 
between the supervisors in the US and the UK. Hence, building trust through deepening 
cooperation among supervisors across the borders is greatly vital to manage this 
increasingly interconnected banking system.       
 
5.2 Managing Monetary and Exchange Rate Stability Amidst of Global Stimulus 
The monetary and exchange rate policy stances of central banks, particularly for 
major advanced economies, have frequently been swiftly transmitted to other part of the 
world through this globally integrated banking system. The transmission of the “policy 
shocks” has made conducting monetary and exchange rate policy arguably to be even more 
complex, particularly for the recipient economies. A study done by Ceterolli and Goldberg 
(2008) for instance finds the globalization of banking in the United States is influencing 
monetary transmission mechanism both domestically and in foreign markets.  
A similar experience has also been reported from the recent quantitative easing 
measures by the US Federal Reserve. It is estimated around USD236 billion total private 
capital outflow per quarter during the US Federal Reserve quantitative easing measure (QE-
1) and about USD278 billion per quarter during the first two quarters of QE-2 (Table 9). 
These rates are higher than the average of USD204 billion per quarter during the period with 
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no QE measure between November 2009 and October 2010. A slightly above 20 percent of 
these total capital outflows were eventually absorbed by the Asia-Pacific economies. As 
demonstrated in the Table 9, a fair share of the increase in the private outflow during the 
second quantitative easing (QE-2) was in the form of other private claims, namely via 
international bank lending.   
 
Table 9: US Gross Private Capital Outflows Following Past QEs 
Quarterly Average in USD billion QE-1 QE-2* No QE** 
Direct Investment -80.8 -85.9 -86.0 
Portfolio Investment -74.1 -50.8 -37.6 
Other Private Claims -82.0 -141.6 -81.2 
Total -236.9 -278.3 -204.8 
Note: */QE2 includes data on the first two quarters.  **/ No QE covers the period of Oct 
2009- Sept 2010. Source: the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analyses and Morgan (2011). 
 
There are obvious and wide implications of these stimulus measures for the 
monetary and exchange rate policy management across the globe, including the emerging 
markets of East and Southeast Asia. To start, a weaker USD against major currencies 
around the world was reported in the past QEs.  The US dollar was in average hovering 
around 0.687 and 0.757 against the UK pound sterling and the euro, respectively, during the 
three months period prior to implementation of the QE-1. By the final three months of QE-1, 
the US dollar has depreciated by almost 11 percent against the UK pound sterling and 9.2 
percent against the euro. As for the final three months of the QE-2, the US currency 
weakened by around 6 percent against the pound sterling and the Japanese yen, and at 
around 11.6 percent against the euro from the average rates reported during the last three 
months prior to the implementation of the QE-2.  Similar general trends were reported in 
currencies of major Latin American economies such as Brazilian real, Mexican peso and the 
East and Southeast Asian currencies such as Korean won and Indonesian rupiah (Figure 
21). The strong domestic currency against the US dollar and the weak demand due to slow 
GDP growth impose risk to the competitiveness of export products of these emerging 
markets. Many central banks, including in the East and Southeast Asian region, had to 
intervene and manage the appreciation pressure and volatility of the local currencies, and 
absorbed the balance sheet costs of these intervention. 
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Figure 21: Quantitative Easing and the US dollar Rates 
 
Note: An increase in the rate implies an appreciation of the US dollar. Source: CEIC database 
 
Furthermore, managing asset bubble and headline inflation have become more 
complex as well amidst these global stimulus. As discussed earlier (and demonstrated by 
Figure 19), international bank lending has fuelled a rise in the residential property price. In 
addition, a rise in the past quantitative measures underpinned rising commodity prices, and 
potential similar consequences of the latest QE should also be anticipated. The world 
commodity price index rose as much as 29.4 percent and 31.7 percent at the peak reached 
in October 2009 for the QE-1 and April 2011 for the QE-2, respectively, from the levels one 
month prior to the implementation of those policies (Figure 22). The rise was particularly felt 
in the energy sector with the commodity fuel price index rose well above 40 percent during 
each of the two QE episodes. The combination of surges in the asset and commodity prices 
contributed to the unanchored inflation expectation and thus complicated further the 
management of price stability in many economies across the globe, particularly those 
experiencing massive inflows of the private capitals. In the second half of 2012, we 
witnessed announcements and implementations of multiple stimuli by the monetary 
authorities/central banks of the advanced economies (Box 1). The combination of stimulus 
efforts will undoubtedly make the management of monetary and exchange rate policies even 
more complex for the regional central banks in Asia.     
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Figure 22: Global Commodity Price Index* 
 
Note: */this index includes both fuel and non-fuel commodities. Source: IMF 
 
Box 1: Recent Monetary Easing Measures in Major Advanced Economies 
The Federal Reserve (Fed) embarked on QE3 in September 2012 and anticipated the low federal funds 
rate to stay till at least mid‐2015. The newest round of quantitative easing would involve monthly 
purchase of additional $40 billion of agency mortgage‐backed securities, and no ceiling or end date was 
set. The length of the program would hinge on development of labor market. Meanwhile, the Fed would 
continue with its Operation Twist program which started in late 2011 with $ 400 billion and expanded by 
another $267 billion in June 2012. The Fed also anticipates the federal funds rate to remain at 0‐0.25 
percent till at least mid‐2015. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in August 2012 
as the latest easing efforts to improve financial conditions and stimulate growth. The OMT would 
replace the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) which was originally introduced in May 2010 and has 
accumulated a stock of $ 270 billion. The major difference between OMT and SMP is that purchase 
under OMT would be conditional on EFSF/ESM program. Moreover there is no preset limit on the size, 
and the coverage would be shorter term bonds (mainly sovereign) at the 1‐3 year maturity.  
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) boosted the Asset Purchase Program by 5 trillion yen in April and 10 trillion 
Yen ($128 billion) in September 2012. The program was first established in October 2010 with a size of 
35 trillion yen, and aimed to enhance monetary easing by reducing long term market interest rates and 
risk premiums. Since then the program was expanded several times and currently has a size of 80 trillion 
yen. At the same time, the BoJ would continue its zero interest rate policy adopted since October 2010. 
The Bank of England (BoE) activated the Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR) in June and increased 
the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) by £50 billion in July 2012. The ECTR is a contingency liquidity facility 
launched in December 2011 that enables the BoE to provide liquidity with a much wider range of 
collaterals than in normal indexed long term repo operations. The BoE would conduct the operation at 
least once a month with a minimum size of £5 billion.  
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5.3 Branch versus Subsidiary: Does It Matter? 
Subsidiarisation has attracted much recent policy interest as a means of “ring-
fencing” domestic banking sector from external shocks. Early works such as Mihaljek (2010) 
and Fietchter et al. (2011) claim that the attraction of being able to easily ring-fence the 
assets of subsidiaries of foreign banks as opposed to foreign bank branches arguably leads 
banking regulators to favour an organizational bank structure comprised mainly of 
subsidiaries rather than branches. Other studies noted however that subsidiarisation of 
foreign banks in an economy does not, by itself, necessarily reduce cross-border capital 
flows, both between the subsidiary and its head office and related bank group branches, or 
with other banks.  The pros and cons of adopting subsidiary structure over branch vary as 
summarized in Table 10. From the bank’s perspective, the debate ranges from the cost of 
doing business to the overall degree of independent cash-flow management. Opening a 
branch for instance would cost the group less than establishing a subsidiary. Yet, the 
subsidiary structure may work well, especially for retail banks, as it may benefit from a local 
and more independent management team that has a deep understanding of the local market 
and a greater ability to obtain local funding.  
 
Table 10: Summary of Perspectives on Branch versus Subsidiary 
Branch Subsidiary 
Bank perspective 
 Free flow of intra-group capital and 
liquidity with integrated organizational 
and risk management. 
 Costs of doing business may be lower 
under the branch structure than under 
the subsidiary structure. 
 Enable the banking group to mobilize 
and re-direct funds from healthy affiliates 
to an affiliate that finds itself in trouble 
due to country-specific shocks, or to 
draw on excess capital/liquidity of an 
affiliate at times of stress for the parent. 
 Losses incurred by an affiliate or the 
parent could, in principle, be isolated 
from the healthy parts of the group. 
 For a global universal bank, the branch 
structure that facilitates cross-border 
inter-affiliate funding would assist in the 
provision of a broad range of services to 
large corporate clients around the world. 
 Branches allow global banks to manage 
liquidity more efficiently at the group 
 Independently managed affiliates that 
are financially and operationally self-
sufficient. 
 Maintaining greater self-sufficiency of 
affiliates requires that each affiliate hold 
higher capital and liquidity buffers to 
limit the likelihood of failure. 
 Parent bank prevented from taking swift 
action due to certain restrictions on 
moving capital and liquidity from a 
subsidiary in one country to a parent or 
a subsidiary in a different country. 
 Better able to continue as a going 
concern should other parts of the group, 
or the parent, fail or have to be 
resolved. 
 For a global retail bank, greater 
importance attached to the access to 
local deposit guarantees and a 
relatively lower weight assigned to large 
exposure limits. 
 The subsidiary structure may work well 
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level. 
 Counterparty and liquidity risks reduced 
through internalization of clearing and 
settlement of securities and cash 
payment obligations. 
for retail banks, as it may benefit from a 
local management team that has a 
deep understanding of the local market 
and a greater ability to obtain local 
funding. 
 
Policymaker perspective (host country)  
 Branches could provide host country 
borrowers with easier access to foreign 
credit. 
 The host country is better off with the 
branch structure if facing a shock to the 
domestic economy or the financial 
system as the branch structure entails 
stronger commitment, in principle, on the 
part of the parent bank to support its 
affiliates. 
 In the event that an affiliate operating in 
a host country falls into distress, the host 
country would have a relatively lighter 
obligation and burden when dealing with 
a branch, which is the responsibility of 
the parent bank and home authorities, 
than with a subsidiary. 
 The subsidiary model could be better 
for local market development as 
subsidiaries are more likely to rely on 
local savings. 
 Supervisory control and oversight 
responsibility of the host country are 
greater under the subsidiary structure. 
 Subsidiary structure permits host 
country supervisor to impose the 
regulations that could protect the 
depositors of the institutions doing 
business in their jurisdiction. 
 The host country is better off with the 
subsidiary structure when facing 
adverse external shocks as it is easier 
to ring-fence the subsidiaries of foreign 
banks than their branches. 
 Organizing banking groups as a 
constellation of separate legal 
subsidiaries may facilitate 
implementation of recovery and 
resolution plans that provide systematic 
and holistic blueprints to facilitate 
orderly wind-down of systemically 
important financial groups in the event 
of failures. 
 
Furthermore from the perspective of the supervisor of the host economies, financial 
stability benefit of subsidiary or branch may in fact be influenced by the origin of the 
economic and financial turbulence. 
 If the parent bank in the home jurisdiction or head office-related entities run 
into liquidity or solvency problems:  a ring-fenced foreign bank subsidiary may 
be more isolated from these problems elsewhere in its bank group.  The 
subsidiary holds its own assets and capital that are legally separate from the 
parent bank.  The parent bank and creditors of the parent bank have no 
recourse to the assets of the subsidiary, and can only recover the capital that 
the parent bank has invested in the subsidiary after creditors and deposits of 
the subsidiary have been paid.  The host jurisdiction banking regulator also 
has greater control over the liquidation of the subsidiary. 
37 
 
 If the foreign bank subsidiary in the host jurisdiction runs into liquidity or 
solvency problems (that are unrelated to the parent bank):  the flip-side of 
ring-fencing is that the subsidiary may be perceived to have less support from 
the parent bank and its bank group, and also from the home jurisdiction 
regulator.  This places the burden of lender-of-last resort on the host 
jurisdiction regulator. 
Local economic conditions of the host and home countries also influence significantly 
the performance of the subsidiary and branch of the global banks. During the past economic 
and financial crisis, originated predominantly from the emerging economies, foreign bank’s 
branch and subsidiary performed more robustly and efficiently than domestic commercial 
banks, as demonstrated by a more stable lending and a more aggressive action against bad 
loans. However during the recent global financial crisis, the branch and subsidiary of the 
foreign banks in general cut back their bank lending more aggressively, particularly in 
Eastern Europe. Furthermore studies have also reported a high presence of foreign bank 
increases exposure of host economies to cyclical conditions in the home countries of those 
banks.  
Furthermore, it is not clear that the market differentiated between branches and 
subsidiaries of a bank group that was in trouble during the recent global financial crisis.  A 
classic example is the case of the Lehman Brothers. The loss of confidence in Lehman 
Brothers affected both branches and subsidiaries alike, leading to the collapse of the whole 
group.  Similarly, based on the balance sheets of a number of major foreign banks in the 
ASEAN+3 region (listed in Table 2), both subsidiaries and branches seem to weather their 
crisis equally well. As reported and discussed earlier, capital adequacy levels in general 
remain above Basel II and in some cases of the Basel III requirements. Furthermore, these 
foreign banks continued to sustain profit amid the volatile global financial market. As far as 
their lending and liquidity position, our limited observation fails to detect a significant gap 
between subsidiary and branch. Nonetheless, a more in-depth research with a much more 
comprehensive data of the banking system of the region is urgently needed to generate a 
more conclusive finding. 
To manage any potential high cost of bail-out, the United States Federal Reserve in 
December 2012 proposed that the policy on the foreign banks be tightened to protect 
taxpayers from having to bail them out. The US has traditionally relied on foreign supervisors 
to watch overseas banks, allowing them to hold less capital than their domestic counterparts. 
The 2010 Dodd-Frank broad overhaul of the US financial landscape put an end to that 
policy, after the Federal Reserve was forced to extend hundreds of billion dollars in 
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emergency loans to overseas banks in the financial crisis. The recent move will require 
foreign banks to group all their subsidiaries under a holding company, subject to same 
capital standards as US holding companies. 
6. Brief Concluding Remarks 
As clearly demonstrated in a recent global financial crisis, the economic shocks from 
one part of the world can swiftly be transmitted to another via both trade and financial 
channels. For the emerging markets of the ASEAN+3 economies, banking remains a key 
transmission channel of shock through the financial sector. The increasing presence and 
importance of the foreign banks in the domestic economy have not only been beneficial, but 
have also increased the exposure of the local economy to volatilities of the global financial 
markets.  
The objective of this study is to identify a number of features and characteristics of 
foreign banks’ activities in East and Southeast Asian economies. In particularly, the study 
highlights certain key fundamental challenges facing the regulatory institution and central 
banks in dealing with these global banks. There are a number of regulatory and supervisory 
adjustments to be considered nationally, regionally and even globally. At these different 
levels of policy formulations, designs and implementations are increasingly needed to be 
carried out in a coordinated manner to maximize the effectiveness of the measures given the 
highly integrated banking system. Concurrently, it is also important to recognize that over-
regulated banking system could potentially limit the benefits of having foreign banks for the 
domestic economy.    
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